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A Look at the United States Army’s New Field Manual 3-90 Tactics and Forrest at Brice’s Cross Roads
(Part 2)
By Colonel (Ret.) James Garrett
The offense is the ultimate means commanders have of imposing their will on enemy forces. (1)
This article is the second of two which explores the tactical decisions made by Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest in light of the United States Army’s newly published tactical field manual and its offensive operations doctrine. This first article addressed the tactical framework described in the Army’s field manual and described what Forrest did at Brice’s Cross Roads. That article explored how Forrest found the cavalry vanguard of Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis’ expedition; that he fixed Brigadier General Benjamin Grierson’s two cavalry brigades in place; that he finished off the entire Union expedition by fighting it in detail; and that he followed through with his victory. This article will explain how Forrest achieved his signature victory through the use of the types of offensive operations prescribed by the Army’s new field manual on tactics, Field Manual (FM) 3-90.
The field manual provides Army leaders with “how-tos” and “ways” to employ decisive action against the enemy. This article will focus on Forrest’s battlefield command decisions overlaid on offensive operations as described by the new manual and, for uniformed leaders and historians who have not been exposed to Forrest’s command traits and abilities, it will perhaps whet the appetite to further study Forrest’s unique military talent .
Biographers of Nathan Bedford Forrest have well documented the Confederate cavalryman’s lack of any formal education during his formative years. (2) Moreover, upon the outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861 and later at the time of initially assuming command of a regiment, Bedford Forrest completely lacked any military education or training in the art of warfare. By the time of Brice’s Cross Roads Bedford Forrest’s military training and education were the result of three years “on the job training.” His experiences ranged from commanding cavalrymen in battle as part of larger formations at Shiloh and Chickamauga to leading independent cavalry commands at engagements such as Parker’s Crossroads and Okolona. Common to all of these experiences in the three years leading to Brice’s Cross Roads were Forrest’s natural leadership
abilities, instinct, and common sense. The gained military experience intersected perfectly with his natural abilities on June 10, 1864.
The Stage is Set
Union Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis stopped for the night on June 9, 1864 with his 8,500 strong combined cavalry-infantry expedition at Stubb’s Plantation, nine miles northwest of Brice’s Cross Roads. The march from Memphis had been slow, bogged down by rainy conditions and mud. Sturgis had pondered turning around just days earlier at Ripley, Mississippi, but decided to press forward to meet his objective to find and destroy Forrest’s command or, in the alternative, keep Forrest busy and away from Tennessee. Sturgis’ force was comprised of two brigades of cavalry totaling 3,300 troopers commanded by Brigadier General Benjamin Grierson. Following the cavalry were three brigades of 4,200 infantrymen commanded by Colonel William McMillen. The expedition also contained 22 pieces of artillery.
Forrest’s one available division of cavalrymen was commanded by Brigadier Abraham Buford and was comprised of brigades commanded by Colonel Tyree Bell (2,400 strong); Colonel Hylan Lyon (800); Colonel William Johnson (500); and Colonel Edmund Rucker (700). The division was supported by two batteries (eight guns) of Captain John Morton’s artillery. Daybreak on June 9th found Forrest’s available command dispersed:
Bell – in the vicinity of Rienzi (almost 25 miles north of Brice’s Cross Roads); Lyon – at Booneville (15 miles north of the Cross Roads); Rucker – arrived at Booneville from the New Albany/Ripley screening mission; Johnson – at Baldwyn (about 5 miles east of the Cross Roads); and Morton’s Artillery – at Booneville.
Toward the end of the day, Forrest learned from scouts that Sturgis had camped at Stubb’s Plantation on the Ripley Road. Forrest, knowing Sturgis’ route of march would take him through Brice’s, made his first important command decision. He ordered Buford’s Division to consolidate on the Cross Roads.
Offensive Operations
“Offensive actions are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on the enemy.” (3) There are four types of offensive operations: 1 Movement to Contact; 2 Attack; 3 Exploitation; and 4 Pursuit. (4) FM 3-90 Tactics describes them as the general sequence of the offense.
Movement to Contact. Movement to contact is designed to establish contact with the enemy and develop the situation. (5) The manual describes two types of movements to contact: search and attack; cordon and search. Both Forrest and Grierson had their commands up and on the move early on June 10, 1864. Forrest moved south from Booneville with Lyon’s and Rucker’s Brigades on the Carrollville Road. He knew Grierson’s route down the Ripley Road would take him to Brice’s Cross Roads and Forrest wanted to arrive at that critical terrain juncture before the Union cavalry. Forrest paused briefly after reaching Carrollville, approximately five miles northeast of the Cross Roads as Johnson’s Alabama Brigade met him there to be supplied with ammunition and provisions after their ride from northern Alabama. Before leaving Carrollville, Forrest sent word to Buford to detach a regiment to take a road west from Carrollville which ran to almost the Tishomingo
Creek bridge north of the Cross Roads. As the Confederates pulled out of Carrollville with Lyon’s Brigade leading, Forrest called forward a detachment of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry under Lieutenant Robert Black and made another critical decision of the day. He directed Black to move to the Cross Roads and locate the Union forces. Black’s men spurred their mounts forward to the Cross Roads and, not finding any sign of Union cavalry, moved north on the Ripley Road. Almost two miles past the Cross Roads, Black’s detachment ran into the lead element of Waring’s Brigade. After a quick exchange of shots, Black turned his men around
and headed back to Forrest, accomplishing his mission.
Forrest pushed forward Lyon’s Kentucky Brigade who met Waring’s Brigade on the Carrollville-
Baldwyn Road about one-half mile northeast of the Cross Roads. Moving quickly, Forrest
directed Lyon to send a mounted company forward to test the enemy’s strength. “They came
back as fast as they went.” (6) At this point (approximately 10:00 a.m.), Forrest knew he had to do
three things: 1 buy time for his entire command to concentrate on the battlefield; 2 prevent
the Union cavalry from having freedom of movement; and 3 seize and maintain the initiative.
Forrest rapidly made two important tactical decisions which proved decisive. First, Forrest
ordered Lyon to dismount his Kentuckians and attack the Union line. Secondly, he sent Captain
A.H. Tyler and two companies of the 12th Kentucky Cavalry to gain access to the Guntown Road
and screen the extreme left flank of the Confederate forces. The intense opening stage of the
battle caused Grierson to commit his other cavalry brigade. Winslow led his troops from their
position north of the Cross Roads to a position on Waring’s right and bent slightly backwards to
the Guntown Road as a result of seeing Tyler’s movement there. By forcefully developing the
situation and forcing his enemy to react, Forrest gained the upper hand. The Confederate
commander seized the initiative and never let it go.
Attack. An attack is an offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain, or
secures terrain and incorporates coordinated maneuver. (7)
After engaging Waring’s troops for almost an hour, Lyon pulled his troops back but kept up fire on the Union cavalrymen. Rucker’s Brigade of Mississippians and Tennesseans arrived on the battlefield and Forrest directed Rucker to take their position on Lyon’s left flank. Once his men dismounted, Forrest ordered Rucker forward into Winslow’s Brigade. A fierce fight between the Iowans of Winslow’s Brigade and Rucker’s men ensued. Rucker’s line of Mississippians and Tennesseans became separated as they moved forward into the thick underbrush of the woods and the Mississippians moved too far forward. Unable to support each other, Rucker’s men had to withdraw under the scathing fire of the Iowans.
Close behind Rucker, Johnson’s Brigade of Alabamians arrived from Carrollville. Forrest placed Johnson’s men on Lyon’s right flank, north of the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road. Although he was still waiting for his largest brigade under Bell and the artillery to arrive, Forrest decided to initiate an attack of his 2,200 troops on the field across Grierson’s entire 3,300-man defensive line. The Confederate commander knew he would soon be pressed for time as the Union infantry would arrive at the Cross Roads. Because the thick undergrowth and patchwork cleared fields in the area made communication difficult, if not impossible, Forrest made the first of several movements across his interior line on a small farm lane that connected the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road to the Guntown Road. Forrest told his commanders of the attack and encouraged his soldiers along the way. As the bugle sounded “charge,” the three Confederate brigades lunged forward into the Union cavalrymen. Although Rucker’s 7th Tennessee Cavalry ran into the rapid fire of the Iowans again, they pushed forward into the storm of bullets and closed on the Union cavalrymen. Just to the Tennesseans’ right, Lyon’s Kentucky Brigade plowed into Waring’s Brigade and, specifically, the line held by the 7th Indiana Cavalry. These Union troopers had been engaged almost continuously with Lyon’s men since the battle began. The 7th Indiana’s line began to waver and finally broke. A gap between Grierson’s two brigades developed so he ordered both to withdraw about one-quarter of a mile towards the Cross Roads. The Confederates pressed the attack as the Union cavalrymen withdrew but once the Union line was reestablished, the Confederate advance stalled between 12:00 and 12:30 p.m. Grierson’s cavalrymen were low on ammunition and urgently waited on the Union infantry to respond to their commander’s repeated summons for help and to arrive at the Cross Roads.
Forrest, too, was waiting for his “ace.” Shortly after 1:00 p.m., Morton’s artillery and Abraham Buford arrived. Buford advised Forrest that Bell’s Brigade, having the furthest to travel, would soon be on the field. As Bell arrived with the largest brigade, Forrest left Buford in charge of the Confederate right of Lyon’s and Johnson’s Brigades with instructions to attack when he heard Bell’s men engage the Union defense. Forrest then personally led Bell’s Brigade across to the Guntown Road and then deployed Bell’s men on both sides of the road. Captain Tyler and his 12th Kentucky Squadron then moved westward, almost to the Pontotoc Road. Forrest’s command was now concentrated on the battlefield.
The Union infantry hurried to the Cross Roads from various positions along the Ripley Road. Alternating running and quick-marching in the June heat and humidity, the infantrymen began to arrive around 1:30 p.m. and completed a relief of Grierson’s cavalrymen shortly after 2:00p.m With the exception of the 4th Iowa Cavalry, all of Grierson’s units withdrew north of Tishomingo Creek and off the main battlefield. McMillen’s infantry division (minus Colonel Edward Bouton’s United States Colored Troops (USCT) Brigade which halted north of Tishomingo Creek) occupied a defensive arc around the Cross Roads, which ran from north of the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road to just west of the Guntown Road. McMillen also established a one-regiment
defensive position on a knoll half-way between the Cross Roads and Tishomingo Creek which would play a critical role in the battle.
Forrest did not want to lose the initiative nor allow the Union infantry to rest so he ordered Bell
and Rucker to attack. Bell’s cavalrymen moved forward through some of the thickest underbrush on the battlefield and initially found success due to Union confusion. The Confederate attack, however, faltered because of stiff resistance, particularly from the 114th Illinois which was positioned along the eastern side of the Guntown Road. Bell reformed his men and, with Forrest personally leading through the thickets, renewed the attack.
Leaving Bell to press home the attack, Forrest disengaged and mounted his horse near the
Guntown Road and rode across to the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road. Forrest saw that Rucker and Lyon were heavily engaged. He quickly met with Buford then rode to Morton’s artillery location. It was then he learned from Buford that Colonel Clark Barteau and his 2d Tennessee Cavalry had arrived on what turned out to be a flank march.
The Decisive Attack with a Double Envelopment. The entire Union line was under severe pressure and Forrest sensed the time arrived for a decisive attack to break the Union infantry. He told Morton when he heard the bugle sound to bring his guns to bear with double canister and closely support Lyon and Rucker along the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road. Forrest next found Buford and told him he was going to hit the Union line “on both ends.” (8) While Barteau’s Tennesseans were attacking the Union regiment defending the extreme left flank on the knoll between the Cross Roads and creek, Forrest would order a reinforced Captain Tyler to launch his Kentuckians against the far right Union flank. On the bugle’s signal the entire Confederate line would renew the attack against McMillen’s hard-pressed Union infantry line.
Forrest then made his last ride across his line. He found Tyler and informed him of the plan. Leaving his escort and a company of Georgians with Tyler, Forrest moved eastward to the Guntown Road to Bell’s position and had the bugler sound “charge.”
Tyler’s men attacked along the Pontotoc Road into the Union right rear while the 2d Tennessee Cavalry escalated their attack on the knoll and left rear flank of the Union line. The main effort of Forrest’s final attack against the Union line, however, was Lyon and Rucker who were closely supported by Morton’s guns. The artillery poured double canister into the Union ranks from a range less than one hundred yards. The Union line wavered and broke in the vicinity of the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road, causing the remaining Union infantry regiments, now unsupported, to retreat.
Exploitation. “Exploitation following a successful attack seeks to disorganize the enemy in depth and disintegrate enemy forces so they have no alternative but to surrender or retreat.” (9)
Forrest sat on his horse on the plateau of the Cross Roads and saw Union soldiers running toward the bridge over Tishomingo Creek while a weak and hastily organized defensive line tried to hold back pursuing Confederate soldiers. The Confederate commander could have easily called off the attack and be satisfied he had stopped the advance of Sturgis’ Expedition, but that was not Forrest’s nature. He wanted to “keep the scare on” and destroy the Union force. (10) Forrest directed Morton to unleash destructive fire from the Cross Roads on the bridge and retreating Union forces beyond the creek. Forrest and Buford pressed their men forward, having infused fresh soldiers in the ranks by replacing the horse holders (approximately 1 in
every 4 men was detailed a horse holder when the unit fought dismounted).
The Confederate cavalrymen advanced across Tishomingo Creek and north on Ripley Road. They soon met a stiff defensive line held by Colonel Edward Bouton’s USCT Brigade which had been given the mission to cover the Union retreat. A brisk fight ensued, and Forrest brought forward Morton’s guns and maneuvered his troops around the USCT’s right flank. This combination caused Bouton to conduct a fighting withdrawal to the next defensive line farther north at White House Ridge.
The USCT occupied a strong position on the ridge, causing the Confederates to attack uphill. As dusk set in, Forrest, who was in the lead of his troops, saw the defensive line and found Captain Morton on the Ripley Road, about one-quarter of a mile from White House Ridge. Forrest told Morton he would lead an attack parallel to Ripley Road against the position on the ridge. He wanted Morton to charge his guns, unsupported, as close as Morton could get to the Union line and pour double canister into the USCT troops. The attack became one of the fiercest hand-to-hand fights of the day as one of the USCT regiments counter-attacked against the Confederate advance. (11) Morton’s artillery charge, however, proved to be decisive and destructive. The USCT was unable to hold the position and retreated northward toward their previous night’s camp at Stubb’s Plantation.
Pursuit. “Pursuit is an offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force
attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.” (12)
The field manual’s definition of pursuit could not describe Forrest’s intent after the Battle of
Brice’s Cross Roads any better. He had defeated in detail both components of Sturgis’ Expedition. Darkness had overtaken the soldiers on both sides. Just like his decision point on the Cross Roads, Forrest could have, perhaps even more understandably, called it a day and allowed his troops a much needed rest. FM 3-90 relates that successful offensive operations share the characteristics of audacity and tempo. Forrest certainly understood both. He was not satisfied with defeating Sturgis. Forrest wanted to destroy the Union force. To do that, he needed to sustain the tempo – with audaci.
The Confederate commander regrouped his command for the pursuit and encouraged his soldiers forward on the heels of the fleeing Union troops. (13) About 1:00 a.m., Forrest halted his pursuit and allowed his soldiers a two-hour rest. He then reinitiated the pressure on the routed Expedition. As a result of Forrest’s doggedness and determination after the battle, his men would capture during the pursuit the vast majority of approximately the 1,800 Union soldiers taken prisoner – a pursuit which lasted for almost thirty hours and finally halted approximately sixty-five miles from the Cross Roads.
Conclusion
The Army’s new tactics manual provides the perfect template to divide the Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads into four phases from the Confederate perspective: 1 movement to contact; 2 attack; 3 exploitation; and 4 pursuit. A summation of Forrest’s tactical decisions within each phase clearly demonstrates his learned and natural military genius, at least as defined by FM 3- 90.
Phase 1: Movement to contact. Once Forrest learned the location of Sturgis’ forces on the evening of June 9, 1864, he knew their route of march would take Sturgis through Brice’s Cross Roads. He issued orders for his command, the bulk of which was 22 miles away, to concentrate on the Cross Roads. Forrest did not wait for the concentration before he began the movement to the Cross Roads. Along the 18 miles from Booneville, Forrest knew he needed intelligence to tell him of Sturgis’ location so as he closed on the Cross Roads he sent a cavalry detachment forward to gather the intelligence. Thus, when he spurred Lyon’s Brigade forward to meet the enemy, the Confederates did not arrive near the Cross Roads blind nor surprised. As important, he made the decision to send a regiment on a flank march- in his estimate – to gain the area of what would be the enemy’s flank or rear.
Once his command engaged the enemy, Forrest made two critically important decisions which most likely set the stage for his victory. First, he ordered Lyon to attack and develop the situation. Secondly, he sent Captain Tyler and his 12 th Kentucky Squadron southwest to the Guntown Road to screen any approach from that direction. The attack seized the initiative and simultaneously – aided by the dense underbrush – masked the fact Forrest only had about 700 men on the battlefield. The initiative and attack ultimately bought time for the rest of his command to arrive on the battlefield. These decisions caused Grierson to commit Winslow’s brigade to assist Waring and, because of Tyler’s movement on Guntown Road, Winslow stretched his brigade from Waring’s right flank to Guntown Road. Thus, the length of the line took away any option for Grierson to maintain a reserve force.
Phase 2: Attack. There were a total of four major attacks against the Union line before the decisive attack which employed the double envelopment maneuver. Forrest’s key decisions in this phase of the battle were to order attacks as each of his brigades arrived on the field. He thus ensured the enemy remained fixed and off-balance. Although there were lulls during the battle as each attack culminated, Forrest never lost his tempo nor relinquished the initiative. In fact, he most likely was waiting for all the conditions he had put in motion to set before he made his final push.
The irony of his decision to “hit ‘em on the ends” (or doctrinally, execute a double envelopment maneuver) is that the main effort in the center with Morton supporting Lyon and Rucker using double canister may have been sufficient to break the Union lines. Regardless, Forrest’s intuition and command decision to launch the double envelopment caused mass chaos in the Union ranks and delivered the desired result.
Phase 3: Exploitation. Forrest could have decided on three separate occasions (at the Cross Roads, Holland Ridge, and White House Ridge) during this phase to call it quits and declare victory. His audacity, however, caused him to drive toward his ultimate objective – destroy the Union expedition. He chose to press through stiff defenses to keep pressure on the retreating Union soldiers. Arguably, the decision to have Morton charge (by hand) his artillery pieces to within paces of the Union line at White House Ridge was one of the most aggressive and audacious “Forrest” moves of the war.
Phase 4: Pursuit. Nothing speaks to Forrest’s aggressive command nature better than his decision to push (with Buford) a sixty-five mile continuous pursuit of retreating Union soldiers. What may get lost in the aggressive narrative of his pursuit is the fact that it yielded tremendous spoils and sealed the victory at Brice’s Cross Roads as a complete destruction of the Union expedition. Sturgis lost 200-plus wagons (he arrived at the Cross Roads with about 210), 16 out of 22 artillery pieces; and most astoundingly, 30% of his command. (14) In sum, FM 3-90’s publication in 2023 allows for a fresh look at how the Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads unfolded in phases and, more importantly, how the decisions made by Bedford Forrest throughout each phase built upon each other which ultimately culminated in his signature victory of the Civil War.
About the Author
Colonel (Ret.) James Garrett served on active duty as a Judge Advocate in the US Army for just over 28 years, with the majority of his service in the operational Army. He is a graduate of the Army War College and his last assignment was as the Dean of The Judge Advocate General’s School in Charlottesville, Virginia. Jim is from Mississippi and is a graduate from Delta State and the University of Mississippi School of Law, he now permanently resides in North Mississippi.
Jim has conducted battlefield tours and military staff rides at some of America’s great historic sites like Gettysburg and Antietam.
Sources
(1) Headquarters, Department of the Army (2023) Tactics (FM 3-90) para 3-1. Hereinafter FM 3-90.
(2) See Brian Steel Wills, The Confederacy’s Greatest Cavalryman: Nathan Bedford Forrest (Lawrence 1992) and Thomas Jordan and J.P. Pryor, The Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest and of Forrest’s Cavalry (reprinted New York 1996).
(3) FM 3-90, Chapter 3 introduction.
(4) FM 3-90, para 3-3.
(5) FM 3-90, para. 3-4.
(6) Edwin C. Bearss, Forrest at Brice’s Cross Roads and in North Mississippi in 1864 (Dayton 1979) p. 68.
(7) FM 3-90, para. 3-5.
(8) Bearss, p. 97.
(9) FM 3-90, para. 3-6.
(10) John Watson Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Cavalry (1909) (reprinted Marietta 1995) p. 181.
(11) Morton, p. 179.
(12) FM 3-90, para. 3-7.
(13) Forrest was heard telling his men, “In a rout like this two men are equal to a hundred. They will not stop and fight.” See Morton at p. 180.
(14) The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C. 1880-1901) Series 1, vol. 39, pt. 1, p. 95.