A Look at the United States Army’s New Field Manual
3-90 Tactics and Forrest at Brice’s Cross Roads
(Part 1)
By Colonel (Ret.) James Garrett
“I know they greatly outnumber us…. but the road along which they will march is narrow
and muddy, they will make slow progress. The country is densely wooded and the
undergrowth so heavy that when we strike them they will not know how few men we
have. Their cavalry will move out ahead of the infantry, and should reach the Cross
Roads three hours in advance. We can whip their cavalry in that time. As soon as the
fight opens they will send back to have the infantry hurried up. It is going to be hot as
hell, and coming on a run for five or six miles over such roads, their infantry will be so
tired we will ride right over them. I want everything to move up as fast as possible.” (1)
Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest
in the early morning hours of June 10, 1864 while riding to meet a Union expeditionary force
This article is the first of two which will explore tactical decisions made by Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest on June 10, 1864 under light of the United States Army’s newly published tactical field manual and its offensive operations doctrine. The focus of this first article is the tactical framework in the Army’s field manual that denotes what Forrest did at Brice’s Cross Roads while a subsequent article will identify the types of offensive operations prescribed by the field manual to explain how Forrest achieved his signature victory. (2)
The Army’s cornerstone for battlefield operations is found in the new Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics which provides the military professional with combat-tested “how-tos” and ways to employ decisive action against the enemy. (3) Published in 2023, the FM also allows an
opportunity for military professionals and historians to study past conflicts through the lens of current Army doctrine and is critical in the development of future military leaders. A fresh examination of the command decisions by Forrest leading up to and during the Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads provides a textbook case study.
The Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads has captured and held the attention of Civil War historians and military professionals for decades. The battle had almost everything the Civil War offered (except a siege): Strategic impact; a combined task-force operation; intelligence gathering; cavalry on cavalry (albeit dismounted); cavalry on infantry; artillery charges; leadership personalities; logistical challenges; combat engagement for United States Colored Troops; and a timeless display of tactical command decisions. Moreover, one would be hard-pressed to find another battle in the annals of American history that fits better in the Army’s tactical framework mold better than the decisions and actions of the Confederate commander at Brice’s Cross Roads and is thus, worthy of continued study by historians and leaders at all levels.
Military professionals and noted historians alike agree that Forrest was well ahead of his time in his use of cavalry forces as mounted infantry and his employment of tactics on the battlefield. A famous British Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Garnet Wolseley, termed the Confederate victory at Brice’s Cross Roads “a most remarkable achievement, well worth attention by the military student.” (4) This two-part examination using the application of the Army’s modern-day tactical doctrine – will illustrate just how far into the future Forrest commanded.
The Campaigns of Nathan Bedford Forrest, Thomas Jordan and J.P. Pryor, p.384
Setting the Stage
When Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis led an 8,500 strong combined cavalry-infantry expedition out of Memphis on the first of June 1864, Forrest’s Cavalry Corps was disbursed across northern Mississippi and into Alabama. In fact, Forrest was leading an approximately 2,500-man contingent on a mission into Tennessee to do exactly what Major General William Sherman feared. As Sherman drove on Atlanta, his supply and communication lines back through Chattanooga to Nashville grew longer and more vulnerable to being attacked and cut. To prevent the one Confederate force between Georgia and the Mississippi River capable of carrying out such a mission, Sherman ordered an expedition into North Mississippi to find and destroy Forrest’s command or, as a minimum, hound the Confederate cavalryman to the point that would prevent a raid on Sherman’s vital logistical line.
When Forrest reached Russellville, Alabama, he received a message from Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee, the new commander of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi & East Louisiana, now headquartered on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad at Meridian, Mississippi. Lee informed Forrest that Sturgis had moved into North Mississippi so Forrest headed back to Tupelo.
Neither Lee nor Forrest were certain of Sturgis’ ultimate destination. The two primary thoughts were that Sturgis was headed eastward through Corinth to reinforce Sherman in northern Georgia or that Sturgis intended to move south down the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and into Mississippi’s fertile Black Prairie grain-growing region. But word from civilians and reports that part of Forrest’s command had engaged the Union expedition near Ripley, Mississippi, finally convinced the Confederate leaders that Sturgis’ target was, indeed, the Black Prairie.
Forrest’s Cavalry Corps consisted of two divisions: The First Division was commanded by Brigadier General Abraham Buford; the Second Division was commanded by Brigadier General James R. Chalmers. As Chalmers’ division was in Alabama guarding against potential Federal raids into the industrial area of Selma, Lee wanted to draw Sturgis farther into Mississippi to buy Chalmers time to return. Forrest may have had other ideas, and at the end of conference with Lee, he extracted permission to engage Sturgis should circumstances warrant.
Sturgis’ force was comprised of two brigades of cavalry totaling 3,300 troopers commanded by Brigadier General Benjamin Grierson. Following the cavalry were three brigades totaling 4,200 infantrymen commanded by Colonel William McMillen. The expedition also contained 22 pieces of artillery manned by approximately 400 artillerymen.
Forrest’s one available division of cavalrymen under Buford was comprised of brigades commanded by Colonel Tyree Bell (2,400); Colonel Hylan Lyon (800); Colonel William Johnson (500 troopers detailed from Brigadier General Phillip Roddey’s command); and Colonel Edmund Rucker (700). The division was supported by two four-gun batteries of Captain John Morton’s artillery. Daybreak on June 9, 1864, found Forrest’s available command dispersed with units as far as twenty-five miles northeast of Brice’s Cross Roads.
Toward the end of the day, Forrest learned that Sturgis had reached and encamped at Stubb’s Plantation on the Ripley Road – about ten miles northwest of Brice’s Cross Roads. Forrest, knowing Sturgis’ route of march would take him through Brice’s, ordered Buford’s brigades to concentrate on the Brice’s Cross Roads the next day.
The US Amy’s Tactical Framework
The Army’s new tactics manual creates a tactical framework of find, fix, finish, and follow-through for commanders and their staffs to use when developing, planning, and executing offensive and defensive combat operations.(5) How do Forrest’s concept of operations and command decisions – and the execution of both – at Brice’s Cross Roads mesh with this framework?
Find. “Units find the enemy through aggressive information collection activities that provide commanders with timely, detailed, and accurate intelligence.” “Once the location of the enemy is known, friendly forces conduct actions on contact and maintain contact with the enemy.”(6)
Colonel Rucker’s brigade was engaged in the mission of screening routes of march into Mississippi from Memphis when Sturgis’ expedition began its movement. Rucker’s primary axis was centered on the Tallahatchie River and oriented north. After Forrest returned from the aborted mission into Tennessee, he directed Rucker to “get on the enemy’s right and stay there.”(7) Rucker’s screen provided Lee and Forrest with valuable intelligence of not only direction but of size and composition. As stated above, reports of a skirmish at Ripley between Rucker’s men and lead detachments from Sturgis’ cavalry arm on June 8th convinced Lee and Forrest that Sturgis was headed toward Okolona and the gateway to Mississippi’s breadbasket of the Black Prairie.
Benjamin Grierson’s cavalry broke camp around 5:30 a.m. on June 10, 1864, and moved down the Ripley Road with Colonel George Waring’s First Brigade in the lead, followed by the Second Brigade of Colonel Edward F. Winslow. About two hours later the Federal infantry began their march. The infantry found the road a quagmire of mud after several days of hard rain, particularly following two brigades of cavalry.
Forrest woke early that morning in Booneville– maybe around 4:00 am. – and conferred with Buford, telling him to wait for Bell’s Brigade to arrive before moving. John Morton and his eight artillery pieces would follow with Buford. Forrest took Rucker’s and Lyon’s brigades and moved south toward Carrollville. As Forrest rode along, he noted to Colonel Rucker that the skies had cleared and it was going to be a hot day. He laid out his concept of operations (set forth above) in which he outlined the terrain and weather the Union troops would face; that the Union cavalry would be in advance; that he intended to engage and defeat the Union cavalry; that the Union infantry would be forced forward at an exhausting pace; and that he would defeat them in turn. To achieve surprise, Forrest sent a message back to Buford for him to send a regiment west when he reached Carrollville to find its way into the Federal rear. (8)
Forrest, however, was moving slower than expected. Although he knew the Union route of march, Forrest needed intelligence which told him the location of the Union cavalry. Arriving at Carrollville (approximately five miles northeast of Brice’s Cross Roads) about mid-morning, Forrest sent a detachment of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry under Lieutenant Robert Black forward to the Cross Roads and beyond on the Ripley Road to scout the location of the Federal troops. Black and his cavalrymen passed through the Cross Roads and crossed Tishomingo Creek on the Ripley Road. After climbing out of the creek bottom they crossed Holland Ridge and approached Dry Creek. Black then spotted the advance of Waring’s cavalry and turned back. Waring’s vanguard pursued Black’s detachment down the Ripley Road, and Black sent word of the Federal’s location to Forrest who was just southwest of Carrollville. The Federals would reach the Cross Roads before Forrest but he had found Sturgis’ troops.
Fix. “Fixing the enemy limits their maneuver options and prevents them from repositioning, reinforcing, or reorganizing. Units seek to fix enemy forces with the minimum amount of combat power since fixing an enemy is typically a supporting effort.” (9)
Grierson pushed Waring’s Brigade east past the Cross Roads on the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road. Unsure of the size of the Confederate force, he held Winslow’s brigade in the Tishomingo Creek bottom northwest of the Cross Roads.
Upon receiving Black’s report, Forrest spurred Colonel Hylan Lyon’s Brigade of Kentuckians forward, meeting Waring’s skirmishers and quickly pushing them back to Waring’s main line of dismounted cavalrymen which was about one-half mile east of the Cross Roads. Forrest knew he needed to buy time for the rest of his forces to close on the battlefield. He also wanted to engage the Union cavalry to keep Grierson from moving around the open Confederate flanks so he directed Lyon to make a hard demonstration against Waring’s line. The Confederates used the terrain of dense underbrush and thickets to their favor, masking the fact that they were only about 800 troopers strong. This unknown, along with the fierceness of Lyon’s demonstration, led Grierson to order Winslow’s Brigade forward and form a defensive line anchored on Waring’s right flank and bending in an arc southwest toward the Guntown Road.
After almost an hour, Lyon’s Kentucky Brigade withdrew from the heavy demonstration to its initial positions but kept up long range pressure on Waring’s cavalrymen. Rucker’s 700-strong Brigade arrived after riding hard. Forrest directed Rucker to deploy on Lyon’s left, toward the Guntown Road, and fight dismounted. He then directed an element of Rucker’s command to join Tyler’s detachment of the 12th Kentucky from Lyon’s Brigade. These Kentuckians had earlier moved over on the Guntown Road to screen the Confederate left flank.
Still wanting to keep Grierson’s forces in place until Buford arrived with Bell’s Brigade and Morton’s artillery, Forrest ordered Rucker’s men to launch a strong demonstration just as Lyon’s men had. Rucker’s Tennesseans and Mississippians pushed forward into withering fire delivered by the Iowa Cavalry of Winslow’s Brigade. The Mississippians moved too far forward of the Tennesseans and their right flank came under intense fire, causing them to withdraw to their original position. The result of this left the Tennesseans receiving the attention of both Iowa regiments. The intensity of the Federal fire caused the Tennesseans to recoil to their original position as well.
As Rucker’s demonstration culminated, Johnson’s Alabama Brigade of 500 cavalrymen arrived. Forrest had them dismount and link up with Lyon’s extreme right flank. As noon approached, Forrest now had just over 2,000 troops on-line against Grierson’s 3,300 Federals. Grierson’s position, however, was fixed in place.
The reader should take note of the time-phases on this excellent map provided by the American Battlefield Trust. Union infantry began to arrive on the battlefield between 1:00-2:00 pm. Grierson’s Cavalry Division then withdrew northwest off the battlefield for the remainder of the day.
Finish. “While the enemy is fixed, friendly forces maintain momentum and mass overwhelming combat power to assault an objective to destroy enemy forces. An assault is a short and violent well-ordered attack against a local objective. Finishing the enemy requires aggressive application of combat power and small unit battle drills supported by all forms of contact.”(10)
Forrest decided to press home a full-scale attack against the Union cavalry even though Bell’s Brigade and Morton’s Artillery were still not yet on the field. Using a small, single farm lane that ran from the Baldwyn Road towards the Guntown Road, Forrest rode the length of his line, telling his troopers what he expected and encouraging them in the hot June sun. Once he gave the signal, the bugle sounded across the line and the Confederates sprang forward. Rucker’s men advanced forward of Lyon’s and Johnson’s, and although the Tennesseans again took a withering initial volley they kept advancing against the left flank of Waring’s cavalrymen. Desperate hand to hand combat followed. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Browne of the 7th Indiana sent word to Waring that he urgently needed help. Waring had no reserve to provide assistance to the Hoosiers and their right flank gave way, causing the regiment to retreat towards the Cross Roads. This created a gap at the most vulnerable spot for Grierson – the link between his two brigades. Now Winslow on the right lay exposed to Rucker’s Confederates. Grierson had to adjust his line rearward almost one-quarter of a mile due to the 7th Indiana’s collapse. The Confederate attack, however, ran out of steam across the front of the shortened Union defensive line and paused just past noon.
Buford arrived on the field at approximately 1:00 p.m. with Morton’s artillery. He told Forrest that Bell was right behind him. Forrest directed Morton to unlimber his guns and place counter-battery fire on Waring’s artillery. As Bell arrived with the largest brigade, Forrest placed Buford in charge of the right (Lyon’s and Johnson’s Brigades) and led Bell southward off the Baldwyn Road across to the Guntown Road. Bell then deployed his brigade on both sides of the Guntown Road which allowed the detachment of the 12th Kentucky Squadron to extend almost to the Pontotoc Road. Forrest now had approximately 4,800 troops on the field, yet not all would engage because every fourth to fifth man was detailed as a horse holder (the same held true in Grierson’s command).
Over two and one-half hours of pitched battled, Waring’s and Winslow’s troopers had depleted nearly all their ammunition defending against the preliminary Confederate demonstrations, followed by an all-out attack and were impatiently waiting for the infantry of Sturgis’ expedition to arrive and relieve them.
When Grierson first arrived at the Cross Roads, he sent word back to Sturgis at the Hatchie River that a Confederate force of unknown size had been met just beyond the Cross Roads in the direction of Baldwyn with reports that the Confederate forces had massed at Baldwyn. Sturgis and his escort left the infantry column and headed to the Cross Roads. A series of messages from Grierson met Sturgis on the way, each seemingly more desperate than the one before saying that Grierson had committed his entire force and was heavily engaged and needed immediate infantry help. Sturgis passed the messages back to McMillen, who ordered the infantry advance in quick-time at a pace “as he thought the infantry”(11) could sustain. After two and one-half miles at that pace, soldiers in the lead regiment began to collapse from heat exhaustion and even sunstroke. Other regiments suffered the same.
Sturgis had arrived at the Cross Roads about 1:00 p.m. and found it jammed with horses, wagons, and men. More pressing, he discovered Waring’s line had, for all practical purposes, collapsed on the Union left. McMillen arrived at the Cross Roads soon after to find “everything going to the devil.” (12)
McMillen met Sturgis who told him to send Colonel George B. Hoge’s Second Brigade of Illinois infantrymen on the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road to fill Waring’s old position. Although fatigued to the point of exhaustion, the infantrymen began moving into line. Hoge positioned his five regiments in an arc just east-southeast of the Cross Roads, extending from the Baldwyn Road to just short of the Guntown Road. Four guns of Company B, 2d Illinois Artillery unlimbered in the Brice yard at the Cross Roads and took positions on either side of the Carrollville- Baldwyn Road.
Colonel Alexander Wilkin’s First Brigade neared the Tishomingo Creek Bridge as Hoge’s soldiers were being deployed in their defensive position. As the brigade reached the Cross Roads, McMillen directed the 95th Ohio to follow him and he took the regiment out on the Baldwyn Road and placed it north of the road with its right anchored on the road. McMillen directed Wilkin to deploy the rest of his men – with the exception of the 72d Ohio – down the Guntown Road, tying into Hoge’s right flank.
The 72d Ohio and two guns from the 6th Indiana Battery had been placed on a knoll that overlooked Tishomingo Creek and fronted a heavily wooded area. Perched on the knoll were an old log cabin and an orchard (now called Log Cabin Knoll). The artillery unlimbered in the orchard facing the wood line and the 72d anchored its right on the guns and extended its line northwest, facing the woods where a farm road continued into the wooded area.
Now relieved by the infantry, Grierson moved his cavalry division off the plateau of the Cross Roads and northwest across Tishomingo Creek. With the exception of the 4th Iowa Cavalry, Grierson’s men would only be involved in rear guard actions after their relief.
Sturgis had approximately 3,300 men, two-thirds of his infantry strength, now deployed on the battlefield (Bouton’s USCT Brigade was enroute with the wagon train and would arrive near Tishomingo Creek mid-afternoon). With the exception of Barteau’s 2d Tennessee Cavalry, Forrest had his full complement of almost 4,800 cavalrymen on the field (minus those detailed as horse holders).
Forrest did not want the Federal infantrymen to “catch their wind” after their blistering march/run to reach the Cross-Roads. The Confederate commander, having earlier told Buford to initiate a general assault along the Baldwyn Road as soon as he heard Bell’s attack, ordered Bell forward.
Bell’s men launched through the heavy underbrush directly into the Union’s far right flank. After initial success, Bell’s attack met fierce resistance, and his attack stalled. Forrest had Bell reform his men. Bell pulled forward a 250-man reserve detachment of the 19th Tennessee. Forrest and his escort then dismounted and with Forrest leading through the thickets, Bell’s men resumed a fierce attack on the Federal’s right anchored by the 114th Illinois, 93d Indiana, and 9th Minnesota.
Buford’s men on the Confederate right were also heavily engaged against the Union center and right in the center. Union troops had fixed bayonets in the midst of the struggle while Buford had ordered his men to use their revolvers in the thick underbrush. The result was fierce and brutal hand to hand combat.
Satisfied that Bell and Rucker had regained the advantage on his left and concerned about Buford’s advance, Forrest mounted his horse near the Guntown Road and rode along the length of his line to the Carrollville-Baldwyn Road, encouraging his troopers to press forward along the way.
Forrest met Buford then rode to Morton’s artillery location. From his position behind Johnson’s Brigade, Buford heard gunfire off to his right front and correctly surmised Clark Barteau and his 2d Tennessee Cavalry had joined the battle from their flanking movement which Forrest had directed when first approaching the battlefield. Buford sent word to Forrest confirming Barteau’s arrival. The entire Federal defensive arc was now under severe pressure.
Forrest knew that the time had come for a final push. In the shade of an oak tree, he outlined his plan to defeat the Federal infantry and told Morton of his decisive role. As Barteau hit the Federal left rear on the knoll and Johnson’s Alabamians pressed Hoge’s left, Forrest believed he could unhinge Hoge’s position with close range artillery in support of Lyon and Rucker. Forrest mounted his horse and found Buford and told him of the plan. He then made his third ride of the battle along his lines, finding Tyler on his left. He explained the plan and told Tyler to take his (Forrest’s) escort and the company of Gartrell’s Georgians, and when he heard the sound of the fighting pick up, to attack into the Federal right rear. Forrest moved back across the Guntown Road and when he thought all was ready, he ordered his bugler to sound the charge.
As the Confederates attacked McMillen’s shortened defensive arc, Forrest sent word to Tyler that now was the time to “hit ‘em on the end.”(13) The combination of pressure across his entire front, Morton’s close-range artillery, the sound of fighting to his left rear on the Log Cabin Knoll, and Tyler’s attack on the Union right rear along the Pontotoc Road convinced McMillen to order the retreat away from the Cross Roads. McMillen told the commander of the E Company, 1st Illinois Light Artillery to hold the two roads and have the guns fire cannister to cover the infantry’s withdrawal. Despite the confusion and mass of stragglers in and around the Cross Roads, the withdrawal initially began in an orderly manner with a hastily-formed defensive line formed between the Cross Roads and Tishomingo Creek. However, when a wagon overturned on the Tishomingo Creek bridge and blocked the road the retreat soon devolved into mostly an “every man for himself” rout.
As the Federal defense collapsed, and the Confederates gained control of the Cross Roads. Morton moved to set up his guns and fired north into the Federals along the Ripley Road and at Tishomingo Creek and its bottom lands.
Follow-through. “Once an enemy is finished, actions by friendly forces are not complete. Small remaining elements of the enemy may require friendly forces to destroy them in detail.”(14)
Forrest called this “keep the scare on.”(15) The last vestige of a Union defense was north of Tishomingo Creek. Colonel Edward Bouton had established his USCT Brigade on Ripley Road at Holland Ridge. As the Confederates cleared debris off the bridge and crossed the creek in pursuit of the fleeing Union soldiers, they met stiff resistance from the USCT soldiers. After an engagement of almost 30 minutes, Confederate forces attempted to flank the USCT’s right. The movement caused Bouton to order a withdrawal to the next ridge further north.
While Bouton’s troops bought time on Holland Ridge, McMillen had established a second defensive line on White House Ridge with any available forces he found. However, to keep the Federal troops from regrouping, Forrest kept constant pressure on the retreating Union forces, causing as many as 35 wagons to be abandoned in the short stretch of the Ripley Road from Holland Ridge to White House Ridge. Forrest, in pursuit with his escort, met Morton west of Dry Creek and told him to prepare for an unsupported artillery charge. As Bell’s and Rucker’s Brigades arrived, Forrest ordered them to dismount and attack the new Union position on White House Ridge which was now mostly manned by the two regiments of the USCT Brigade.
Morton’s two batteries charged up the Ripley Road to just short of the Union position and unleashed cannister into the ranks. Bell’s and Rucker’s men ran into stiff resistance and a fierce counter-attack by the 59th USCT, resulting in severe hand-to-hand fighting. Without support however, the USCT regiments were unable to hold the position and withdrew north towards Stubbs’ Plantation.
By now darkness had completely replaced the summer twilight. Forrest rotated fresh troops forward to keep pressure and contact on the retreating Union force. He was heard encouraging his men, “in a rout like this two men are equal to a hundred. They will not stop and fight.”(16)
Forrest was right. Except for a cavalry rearguard, Sturgis offered no defensive stand. Forrest allowed his men to rest for two hours (from 1:00 am to 3:00 am) but had them in the saddle again; doggedly pursuing and scattering and capturing elements of the Union expedition.(17) Forrest would personally lead a column throughout the next day passing through Ripley and beyond until he fell when his horse stumbled and the exhausted general lost consciousness. His Division Commander, Abraham Buford, continued the pursuit for another day, finally calling it off near LaGrange, Tennessee, some 65 miles from Brice’s Cross Roads.
Conclusion
The complete victory for Forrest at Brice’s Cross Roads resulted in the capture of just over 200 wagons, 1,500 small arms, 300,000 rounds of ammunition, 16 artillery pieces and hundreds of rounds of artillery ammunition. The cost to his command was 96 killed and 396 wounded.(18) The grievous casualties tallied among Sturgis’ men were 223 killed, 503 wounded and 1,800 missing or captured – right at a loss of 30% of his entire command.(19) But more than numbers, the victory sealed Forrest in the realm of the military geniuses produced by the Civil War. His command and execution of a doctrinal framework published almost 160 years later is beyond comparison and made even more remarkable given Forrest’s lack of education – both civilian and military. Forrest achieved his victory by instinctively:
(1). Using intelligence collection and reconnaissance to locate Sturgis’ advance guard.
(2). Seizing the initiative by attacking and maintaining pressure while using the dense terrain to mask his inferior numbers and buying time for his command to mass on the field.
(3). Using his knowledge of the enemy’s tactics to know the cavalry would be withdrawn when relieved by the infantry, thus he defeated both Union elements separately.
(4). Pursuing a routed enemy for 65 miles, sealing a complete victory.
On June 10, 1864, Nathan Bedford Forrest expertly demonstrated how the tactical framework umbrella of find, fix, finish and follow-through should be integrated in planning and executed
About the Author
Colonel (Ret.) James Garrett served on active duty as a Judge Advocate in the US Army for just over 28 years, with the majority of his service in the operational Army. He is a graduate of the Army War College and his last assignment was as the Dean of The Judge Advocate General’s School in Charlottesville, Virginia. Jim is from Mississippi and is a graduate from Delta State and the University of Mississippi School of Law, he now permanently resides in North Mississippi.
Jim has conducted battlefield tours and military staff rides at some of America’s great historic sites like Gettysburg and Antietam.
Sources
(1) Edwin C. Bearss, Forrest at Brice’s Cross Roads and in North Mississippi in 1864 (Dayton 1979) p. 64 citing John Allen Wyeth, That Devil Forrest: The Life of General N.B. Forrest, (Dayton 1975) at p. 400.
(2) For an excellent, concise, and timeless military analysis of Forrest at Brice’s Cross Roads see Parker Hills, A Study in Warfighting: Nathan Bedford Forrest and the Battle of Brice’s Crossroads, The Papers of the Blue and Gray Education Society (Danville 1995). A special thank you to Brigadier General Hills for his insights and review of this article.
(3) Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2023) Tactics (FM 3-90). Hereinafter FM 3-90.
(4) Bearss, p. 135 citing Robert S. Henry, ed. As They Saw Forrest: Some Recollections and Comments of Contemporaries (Jackson 1956) at p. 46.
(5) FM 3-90, para. 1-32.
(6) FM 3-90, para. 1-33.
(7) Bearss, p. 59.
(8) Bearss, p. 77.
(9) FM 3-90, para. 1-35.
(10) FM 3-90, para. 1-37
(11) Bearss, p. 81.
(12) Bearss, p. 84.
(13) Bearss, p. 97.
(14) FM 3-90, para. 1-38.
(15) John Watson Morton, The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Cavalry (1909) (reprinted Marietta 1995) p. 181.
(16) Morton, p. 180.
(17) Morton, p. 180
(18) Bearss, p. 133.
(19) The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C. 1880-1901) Series 1, vol. 39, pt 1, p. 95.